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Abstract— As compared to its wired counterpart, wireless
network is relatively new and is exposed to some additional
threats specific to the underlying medium. Among these threats
the jamming attack which can take place easily due to the open
nature of wireless medium. A device or person can continuously
emit radio signals to disturb a valid conversation. If it lasts for
sometime continuously, it can result in total collapse of a network
using single channel.
In order to evade a jammer in an ad hoc network, we
propose a proactive channel hopping scheme based neighbor
correspondence. Rather than detect and react we rely on
prevention is better than cure. Each node communicates with
its neighbors on different channels, coordinated between them
dynamically. Furthermore, the control and data channels of
each node are separated. This way redundancy at the node-level
is provided so that even if nodes on the jammed channel can
not be approached but they still are able to contact others by
visiting their control channels; avoiding the node on the jammed
channel from starvation. Hence, even if the network is exposed
to the jammer, a complete failure is prevented. The simulation
results show that our scheme is efficient and is able to reduce
the jammer’s impact significantly, as compared to the scheme
presented in [8].
Keywords – MANET, Multichannel MAC Protocol, Channel
Hopping, Jamming Attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks are becoming increasingly popular for
all kinds of futuristic networks in todays world. Unlike wired,
wireless networks rely on an open medium and hence face a
far larger set of security threats and vulnerabilities than wired
ones. As we move on from wireless infrastructure to ad hoc,
access point (AP) setup is eliminated and we are left with
no central coordinating authority, varying topology, limited
battery life, lower transmission rate, and desired cooperation
amongst nodes for packet forwarding, etc. Hence the com-
plexity further intensifies posing it as a greater challenge to
achieve similar efficiency and effectiveness as compared to the
wired infrastructure case.
Due to the open nature of wireless medium, an anomaly can
listen to and disrupt an on-going communication by sending
continuous or periodic fake messages resulting in collisions.
Eventually, this can result in increasing backoff at the node
level and extinction of the traffic at the network level. Hence,
a wireless device that intentionally launches radio interference
attacks in a wireless network is referred to as a jammer [6].
Continuous emission of radio signals are taken as physical
layer jamming whereas the MAC layer jamming involves
violation of protocols’ rules on the said layer. Jamming attack
is dealt with active defense strategy which involves either
physical escape of the jammed region, like spatial retreats, or
logical escape that involves channel switching as described in
[3]. The former approach recommends moving away from the
jammed region whereas the latter suggests leaving the jammed
channel and tune to a new channel. Either way, the network
members need to regroup. Active defense is not recommended
for smaller devices and passive strategy, like doze for long
periods to save energy, is generally opted. Nodes remain
physically and logically in the area being jammed and monitor
the channel periodically while dozing. Network is restored
when the jamming phase is over.
IEEE 802.11 [2] offers multiple channels which can be used
simultaneously to reduce a few of the existing deficiencies of
wireless mentioned above, however practically it is not being
implemented. Usually in an infrastructure based network AP
leads to a new channel if required, either with other APs or
avoid congestion with other APs or due to the underlying MAC
protocol, and nodes follow accordingly. On the other hand,
limited battery life and the lack of central coordination in an
ad hoc network setup hinders the use of multiple channels.
Studies have highlighted that multiple channels can be used
to acquire better network performance through simultaneous
communication of different channels as shown in Figure
1. Though these studies differ in terms of approaches and
required resources but they all emphasize the same concept
that is to use unused and available channels in parallel [13].
Among these techniques parallel rendezvous is considered
robust as it eliminates the single control channel bottleneck
and utilizes all the channels concurrently for data as well as
control packets.
In this study we propose the idea of nodes having their
designated control channels (CC) to be approached by others.
Furthermore, rather than data is exchanged on the control
channel of the receiver, both parties negotiate to come up with
a new channel for data transfer. Both the nodes hop to the new
channel, transfer data and return to their respective channels.
Thus, separating control and data channels for every node pair,
along with each node communicating with its neighbors on
different channels increases redundancy to avoid isolation of
a node and collapse of the total network in case of a jamming
attack.
Figure 1: An ad hoc network with simultaneous multichannel
communication
II. RELATED WORK
Recent studies suggest channel hopping as a logical escape
in case of jammed channel. If a valid communication is not
heard for a period of time on the common channel, nodes initi-
ate jamming attack detection, individually. If the said channel
is detected as jammed, nodes switch channel to locate other
nodes and resume communication as a reactive mechanism.
[10] proposes that once a node switches its channel, it needs
to notify its neighbors by broadcasting this change on other
channels. This strategy can result in heavy traffic in case of a
large number of affected nodes or if the jammer is intelligent
enough to scan other channels forcing legitimate nodes to hop
frequently.
Based on jamming detection, authors in [9] suggest a proto-
col suite with frame masking, frequent hopping, fragmentation
and redundant transmission of packets to overcome a jamming
attack. Depending upon the strategy selected by the jammer,
each one of them is incorporated step-by-step, leaving the
jammer with the option to jam a single channel, as the
best strategy. The protocol suite, when applied as a whole
for every affected node in a dense environment, increases
computation and communication delay and can affect the
network performance.
[7] surveys about the options to escape a jammer which
includes frequency hopping on the basis of a pre-shared secret
function between legitimate nodes. However, they suggest in
[3] to use coordinated channel switching where nodes move
to next channel when current channel is found to be jammed.
Besides this, they have suggested another strategy based on
jammed area detection where only the affected nodes switch
to the new channel instead of whole network. Boundary nodes
are defined just outside the jammed area that bridge the
communication between affected and non-affected nodes by
switching between the two channels periodically. This way,
not all the network undergoes change and only nodes in
the jammed region need to be reorganized. However, this
scheme is tedious and generates additional network traffic for
coordination between nodes. First, the detection of a jammed
region in a distributed manner generates reasonable compu-
tational and communication overhead. Second, the selection
of boundary nodes has a similar impact. Finally the delay
incurred and cost involved due to periodic channel switching
by the boundary nodes are also significant.
The work presented in [8] differs from the above in two
important points. First, rather than reactively switching chan-
nels it takes into account the proactive channel hopping.
Secondly, it considers a knowledgeable jammer which has all
the information to target a valid communication except the
seed shared between the node and the AP. Thus, legitimate
nodes hop channels periodically on a set pattern and jammer
tries to follow them by scanning different channels, randomly.
Channel hop is initiated by the AP using a special broadcast
message. If the node does not receive this message, it hops
to the next channel when it times out. However, they have
not considered scalability of the network and taken only two
legitimate nodes into consideration; one AP and a single
node. Our proposed solution differs in a sense that an ad
hoc network is chosen, having considerable number of nodes,
with the provision that nodes can join or leave the network
any time. Additionally, instead of a set of hopping sequence,
dynamic coordination between nodes exists for selection of
next channel. Besides, it is easy to stay in a single channel
and send a burst of data to overcome channel hopping cost, as
chosen by them. Yet, we restrict to single packet exchange per
visit, that can be modified to multiple data packets anytime,
to increase overall throughput.
While using multiple channels, the channel assignment
strategy is critical. [11] proposes a cross-layer approach for
channel assignment using a multichannel MAC protocol, with
the help of two transceivers on each node. [3] describes
the already fed function to be a simple linear formula, like
selection of next channel as the new channel. The resistance to
jammers does not lie in the complexity of the function rather in
the available channels and the effectiveness of channel hopping
drops if more than one jammer exist [12]. Theoretically, for
a wireless network using ’k’ channels, there must be at least
’k’ jammers to break down the network completely; one for
each channel.
III. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
As it is said that prevention is better than cure, similar is our
proposed solution to mitigate a jamming attack using proactive
channel hopping in an ad hoc network. Every node selects its
control channel through a predefined function which is known
to network participants. Furthermore, data transfer takes place
on a different channel coordinated dynamically between each
pair of nodes. Thus, every node communicates with each of
its neighbors on different channels. From the network level
point of view, every channel can be used for control and data
packets simultaneously. In the sequel, we discuss the major
design aspects of our proposed scheme.
A. Determining Control Channel (CC)
In the formation of an ad hoc network every node selects
its own control channel, docks itself there and waits for
other nodes to visit it (if it has no packets to send). The
control channel is selected via a pre-loaded function based
on the node identity which is shared among nodes and is
kept secret. This way, each node not only selects its control
channel but also learns about the control channel where the
intended destination is residing, if a transmission needs to be
initiated. To avoid an outsider from targeting a particular node
or legitimate communication, the function can be a high level
polynomial which is hard to break by overhearing the traffic.
However, for the sake of simplicity we are incorporating a
simple function. Hence, a neighboring node which wants to
initiate communication with node ’A’ can determine its control
channel using the following function:
CC(A) = IAmodk (1)
where k being the total number of channels and I denotes
the identity of the intended receiver. This way, n nodes will
be distributed over k channels evenly, having (n/k) nodes on
the same channel, on average. To minimize the computation
overhead and avoid the re-computation of the same function,
once determined, the resultant channel is stored in a CC-
table for future correspondences. Additionally, since nodes
need to visit other channels which are the control channels
of intended destinations. Therefore, each node will maintain
its own control channel in the CC-table as well which will be
referred while returning after a successful data transfer. Hence,
sender node first checks a corresponding entry for the intended
destination in CC-table. If not found, the corresponding control
channel is calculated using equation-1 only once for each
node. We are not taking energy consumption into account in
this study, but due to frequent channel hopping, which has
its own delay, the computation delay is reduced. Thus, to get
an estimation of how much computation is saved, we consider
that if node ’A’ intends to communicate with its neighbor node
B for m packets and that only a single packet is exchanged in
each visit. Then (m-1) computations for locating the control
channel of node B and similar number of computations for
returning to its own control channel are avoided by node A.
If we extend the situation to multiple destinations, say node
A sends m packets to j neighbors then A saves the amount of
computation for (j × m) packets
(j × (m− 1)) + (j ×m− 1)
where the first half of the equation refers to the CC of the
destination node and second half is representing return to its
own control channel after each sent packet. So, for n nodes
having large ’m’ packets to send in the network, quite a
computation overhead is diminished.
Once the node knows the receiver’s control channel, it hops
to the corresponding channel where both nodes agree upon a
new channel chosen for data exchange. Since, a single channel
can be used for data and control messages by different pair
of nodes. So, the newly arriving node on the control channel
of intended receiver may disrupt an on going communication.
Therefore, it needs to contend for the medium in the next
slot to initiate its communication formally. Similar situation
is depicted in Figure 2 where node D hops to CC(C), where
already a communication between node A and B is in progress.
Node D senses the medium busy and consequently it keeps
Figure 2: Scenario stating how node D would initiate commu-
nication with node C
silence till the end of the on-going transmission. Later, it
contends for the medium with other nodes.
B. Data Channel (DC) Coordination
Once the sender hops to the control channel of the intended
receiver, rather than they initiate data exchange both coordinate
for a data channel. To have different data channels between
each node pair, the channel is selected using the identities of
both parties. As earlier for equation 2, the complexity of the
function will not yield much difference except the increase
of the computational time only, due to the limited number of
channels. Therefore, the current channel (i.e. control channel
of the receiver) is also taken into account. This way, it becomes
hard for an attacker to guess and target a particular commu-
nication having knowledge of the node identities. Moving a
step further, since the nodes need to coordinate data channel
over an insecure medium, we tailor a key exchange scheme
to incorporate our desired coordination, securely. For this
purpose, the data channel coordination is based on Diffie-
Hellman algorithm [1] as shown in Figure 3 and described
as follows:
The sender initiates the coordination by choosing a secret
random exponent ’a’ and yields
X = gamod p (2)
where g is a publicly known constant [15] and p is a prime
number selected using the identities of sender and receiver
along with the current channel number in use as follows:
p > f(IDreceiver, IDsender, CCreceiver) (3)
X is then sent to the receiver by piggybacking it to the RTS
frame. On receiving this RTS, the receiver generates Y, same
as the sender yielded X, with the help of its secret random
exponent b. The receiver then responds by sending CTS
piggybacked with Y. Both parties then apply their respective
secret random exponent on the information received from the
other, to yield the same value:
Y a = Xb = Z mod k (4)
Thus, Z is the newly selected channel for data exchange.
Both nodes store it in a DC-table for future reference and
switch their transceivers accordingly to initiate data transfer
Figure 3: Elementary Negotiation for a DC between two nodes
Figure 4: Communication Sequence on Data Channel between
a node-pair
on the new channel. Regardless, the data is exchanged suc-
cessfully or it times out due to unavailability of the medium,
in either case nodes will return to their respective control
channels.
When the nodes hop to channel Z for data exchange to avoid
hidden terminal problem on the new channel, they need to
exchange RTS-CTS once again [4]. If successfully exchanged,
data and acknowledgement follow as shown in Figure 4.
For each neighbor, the above sequence is followed only once
and the coordinated data channel is stored in DC-table. For the
subsequent visits, only simple RTS-CTS are exchanged, both
parties refer their DC-table and hop for data exchange. If a
node has more than one visitor on its control channel, it will
choose and accord with one only. The others will wait for
receiver to return to its control channel for their turn, till they
time out.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND ANALYSIS
This section presents the simulation scenario and results
obtained using the OPNET network simulator [14]. The sim-
ulation parameters are summarized in table I. We consider an
ad hoc network consisting of 24 wireless stations with single
transceiver only. All nodes are in the transmission range of
each other, i.e. 1-hop neighbors. To incorporate a saturated
case, the traffic load at the source nodes is 200 pps. whereas
the packet size is chosen to be 512 bytes, each. Only a single
packet is exchanged in each visit between a node-pair. The
physical layer standard taken into consideration is 802.11a
which offers 12 channels in 5 GHz band. For channel hopping
the cost currently considered by different studies is between
40 to 80 µs, so we opted for 80 µs. delay, similar to [11]
and [5]. Besides these, the jammer is located in the center
and all nodes are in the jamming range and we assume that
no communication takes place in this range on the jammed
channel, thus the intensity of jammer is set accordingly. Since,
the jammer is considered as an outsider and on any channel it
tunes into, it is able to listen to legitimate traffic; either control
or data packets. Therefore, the underlying assumption is that
the jammer sticks to such a channel where its intention to block
lawful conversation is fulfilled and by doing so it does not
scan other channels. Hence, in our simulation environment the
jamming attack is launched in the form of a constant jammer
which sticks to a single frequency.
Initially, we compare single channel with multi-channel
proactive hopping for throughput and later with the presence
of jammer in both cases. The network is divided such that
half of the nodes are traffic sources and the rest are treated as
sinks. In a single channel environment, nodes and the jammer
are situated on the same channel. However, for multichannel
scenario sink nodes are evenly distributed so that one on each
channel resides and the remaining are selected as source.
Thus, one sender and receiver reside in each channel, but
the communication pair are chosen from different control
channels to incorporate channel hopping even for the exchange
of control packets. For 100 seconds simulation time, the
jammer is active from 20 to 80 seconds. Figure 5 shows that
in a single channel scenario no legitimate communication is
observed during jamming phase. However for multi-channel
setup with our proposed scheme a couple of node pairs out of
12 are affected, i.e. approximately 17% degradation in overall
network performance is observed when a single channel is
exposed to jammer. The degradation is due to the effect on
node-pairs having their control or data channel being jammed,
depending upon the channel selected by the jammer. The peak
found in the curve is due to those packets that are not discarded
by that time and were successfully retransmitted after the
jamming phase is over. It varies depending upon the number
of nodes and traffic load.
Figure 6 shows the average throughput at the sinks in our
scheme. Nodes having the jammed channel as control and data
channel face nearly the same degradation in throughput on
average and are therefore represented using different colors.
However, if the jamming intensity is decreased or rather than
constant a periodic jammer is incorporated then the difference
will be more evident. For this reason, a pulse jammer, which
disrupts the communication periodically for sometime and
sleeps during the two jamming intervals, is substituted. The
Simulation parameters Parameter value
Physical Layer Standard 802.11a
Number of Channels 12 (in 5 GHz band)
Traffic type CBR
Packet Size 512 Bytes
Traffic Load 200 packets/sec (pps)
Simulation Time 100 sec.
Jammer Type Constant Jammer
Jamming Period 20 – 80 sec.
Table I: Simulation settings
Figure 5: Single channel compared with the proposed scheme
using 12 Node-pairs with traffic load 200 pps, where the
jammer is active during 20–80 seconds
jamming period chosen is 100 ms. and sleep time as 2 seconds,
alternatively. For a 100 seconds of simulation the effect of
pulse jammer on the affected nodes is shown in Figure 7.
This figure gives a view of data packets corrupted and control
packets targeted by pulse jammer. The difference is evident
in terms of plunges in the curves, found more in case of
control channel being jammed. However, with the increase in
jamming intensity the difference is diminished and both nodes
may starve, as presented earlier.
Next, to have a more realistic scenario rather than divide
the topology into active source and sinks, the status of all
nodes is modified so that each one is sender and receiver
at the same time. However, while node A is seeking for
node B, B may be visiting some other nodes or A at the
same time. Such a situation can give rise to a deadlock and
increased packet drops and is thus considered as worst case.
To incorporate the worst case scenario and analyze its effects,
the earlier sinks are therefore changed to senders for different
traffic generation rates, but others are kept unchanged. i.e. all
nodes send and receive simultaneously, as generally observed
in manets. Initially, the traffic load on new sources is kept low
to have a better view of network traffic degradation due to
synchronization issues, when both nodes try to reach another
to deliver their packets. Thus, we start the traffic load on
new sources from 10 pps and gradually increase it to 100
pps, so that all nodes generate similar number of packets.
Figure 6: Sink Status on each channel – Nodewise distribution
Figure 7: Effect of Pulse jamming on nodes having jammed
control and data channels
For a traffic load between 10 to 100 pps for the new source
nodes, the network along with the jammer was tested as shown
in Figure 8. In the worst case scenario, approximately 20%
decline is observed as compared to simpler scenario of a
single channel only as considered in Figure 5. However, the
overall throughput decreases with increase in traffic load and
only 40% of legitimate communication is successful when all
nodes have similar configuration, which declines further in the
presence of jammer to 25% of the generated traffic (only 600
out of 2400 pps are successfully received). But the jamming
phase added pain to the sickness as the lost packets are doubled
from the earlier scenario, to nearly 35%. Above all, we treat
the lastly presented scenario where all nodes are the senders
as worst case due to the fact that when node A is sending to
B the data channel would be different than B is sending to
A. Thus, increasing the number of affected data channels and
nodes.
As compared to other proactive channel hopping schemes
like the scheme proposed in [8], the performance drop was re-
ported as 60% due to jamming, in WLAN context. Moreover,it
is observed that the performance is estimated to decrease
Figure 8: Two way communication between each node-pair
with varied traffic generation rates. Jammer is active from 20
to 80 sec.
further in the case of an ad hoc network. However, with our
proposed scheme in worst case scenario 65% of the network
performance is still retained. Additionally, if we apply the
similar jammer configuration with listen and jam intervals,
slight improvement in the achieved results are expected. Fur-
ther improvement is expected in our scheme if burst of packets,
rather than only one packet, are exchanged in each meeting
between each node pair. Yet, the intention of this study is to
explore the jamming effects on proactive channel hopping only
and analyze future directions for its mitigation.
V. CONCLUSION
Channel hopping is considered a logical escape from the
jammer, either in a reactive or proactive manner. The proposed
channel hopping scheme differs from the already existing
solutions in a sense that separate control and data channels
exist and neighbors coordinate for their corresponding data
channels. Neighborhood communication of a node can be
described as flower-petals, each of different color representing
a distinct channel for each neighbor. Above all, the scheme is
proactive in nature which reduces the impact of a jamming
attack without using any detection mechanism by providing
already existed escape doors for a node. Initially, we have
incorporated simpler scenarios for the ease of analysis and
highlighting the jamming effect on our scheme and then grad-
ually moving to worst case scenario, involving synchronization
issues along with the jamming phase. The obtained results
show that our scheme is efficient for an ad hoc network, as
compared to other proactive schemes. Yet, the focus of this
study is to analyze proposed scheme in terms of jamming
attack. It will help us in developing a robust solution to counter
the jammer more effectively in the future.
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